Part 1

• Pathologies of particularism: Cebu City’s parallel structures for local service delivery Weena Jade Gera University of the Philippines Cebu

  Much has been said about the broadly particularistic nature of many developing polities with the way politicians tend to promote narrow interests to perpetuate themselves into power. Yet more needs to be understood about the structures that create incentives for, and enable the extent of, particularism in public service. This chapter examines the pathology of a distinct mechanism that demonstrates a particularistic character of the local governance regime in Cebu City, that is, the setting up of ad hoc offices that serve as extensions of the Office of the Mayor in all barangays (villages). These offices, which were purportedly designed to serve as bridge between the city and the barangays for a more inclusive governance, operate as parallel structures to the barangay office in various modes of service provisioning. These were adopted across three administrations and were only changed in names: Barangay Mayor’s Office (BMO) under Osmeña administration, Mayor’s Information and Liaison Office (MILO) under Labella administration, and City Hall Satellite Center (CHSC) under the current Rama administration. Osmeña’s BMO and Labella’s MILO were both criticized by their opponents as a usurpation of official barangay functions, which undercut the authority of barangay officials, as they competed with, if not take over, barangay service delivery particularly in the distribution of material government assistance to the constituency. Political observers view these offices as politically motivated, which have been effectively used by sitting mayors as political channels to directly gain favor with the constituency especially in “enemy territories” where chieftains are unallied or hostile to the mayor. As if taking a cue from his predecessors, the current mayor Michael Rama maintains the necessity for city government to connect with the people and sets up the CHSC to “level up” and “upgrade” the system in promoting his program “City Hall at Your Doorstep.”

  The paper begins with a brief background on the features of Cebu City’s political economy, setting the context of its urban governance regime and political character. It then proceeds to examining the dynamics and mechanisms of such parallel structures, including their focus areas, and their effects on broad local service delivery at the barangay level (e.g. rechanneling of barangay funds meant for other programs as used to compete with services delivered by these parallel structures). It then analyzes the interplay of structures and institutions that compels and allows for such arrangements to be sustained, by illustrating the nature of political contestations and the institutional set up of local governance. It argues that the intense battles among warring political factions amid a highly competitive turn-over of power, and the lack of legal impediments and oversight to such ad hoc structures constitute as precursors to Cebu City’s glaringly particularistic form of service delivery. It concludes with insights on institutional redesign that can create disincentives to perpetuating the practice.

Part 2

• Mainstreaming the Margins in Infrastructure Developments: The Case of Iloilo City Rosalie Arcala Hall University of the Philippines Visayas

  The past decade has seen the phenomenal growth of the Iloilo City’s economy. The entry of IT- BPO and real estate giants Megaworld, Ayala, and SM Group provided a boost to local economic activity. This growth was propelled in large measure by big infrastructure projects such as the flood control, network of circumferential and radial roads, and the Iloilo River rehabilitation, which made the city attractive to outside investors. Long-term city-wide planning featured the participation of a highly organized but divided local business associations, who were able to leverage their strong personal connections with the multi-term Mayors and Manila-based investors. Convergence platforms promoting trade, investment, and infrastructure support at the city level enabled robust business-government ties. Planning for the government-funded infrastructure projects was inclusive, featured institutionalized consultation processes, and provided for relocation of displaced urban poor communities.
  The paper examines how stable political leadership afforded by uncompetitive local elections enables long-term economic development planning horizons in government-funded infrastructure projects and infrastructural improvements needed to attract major investments from national- level business conglomerates. Specifically, the paper will examine local transport and road networks as they form crucial backbones to labor mobility and commercial traffic. While based on national government policy and funding imperatives, these infrastructure endeavors are structuring engagements between the city government and marginal sectors (urban poor, small vendors, jeepney drivers and operators, etc.) whose interests have been largely accommodated in previous large-scale public infrastructure projects. How the city government utilizes institutionalized consultation and dialogue processes with marginal sectors on proposed infrastructure projects, and leverages its position vis-vis national government agencies to attain social equity goals will be probed.

• What’s good for PAS is good for Kelantan? Public goods distribution in the capital city of Kota Bharu Azmil Tayeb Universiti Sains Malaysia

  Since 2018, the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS) has dominated the politics in Kelantan by securing absolute majority control of the state legislature, and, with it, a firm hold on all city councils across the state. In short, Kelantan is effectively a one-party state where rival political parties are nearly irrelevant. PAS in Kelantan operates on the idea that the party should be in full control of the government (parti menguasai kerajaan), i.e., that there should be full convergence between the goals of PAS and the state government. In other words, what’s good for the party is good for Kelantan. In a political milieu where one political party reigns supreme, how are public goods distributed? I examine this question by looking at the city council of the state capital, Kota Bharu (Majlis Perbandaran Kota Bharu, MPKB), composed entirely of PAS appointees, and more specifically at road infrastructure and sanitation projects in two very different neighborhoods of the city (Taman Guru and Projek Perumahan Rakyat). I argue that public goods distribution in Kota Bharu is both programmatic and clientelistic: programmatic because MPKB carries out a development agenda promoted by PAS and the state government, and clientelistic because PAS believes that non-party members are unable to contribute to MPKB’s development agenda. Analysis of the two neighborhoods allows me to determine whether variables such as socio-economic profile, proximity to the city center, ethno-religious makeup, and period of existence influences how these communities receive their public goods.

• Mary Joyce Bulao Australian National University

Abstract