Political influence operations through social media in SEA
Type
Double PanelPart 1
Session 3Tue 14:30-16:00 REC A2.06
Part 2
Session 4Tue 16:30-18:00 REC A2.06
Convener
- Kris Ruijgrok KITLV Leiden & University of Amsterdam
Discussants
- Ward Berenschot KITLV
- Yatun Sastramidjaja University of Amsterdam
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Add to CalendarPart 1
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Towards the Comparative Study of Domestic Influence Operations: Cyber troops and Elite Competition in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand
Kris Ruijgrok KITLV
Online influence operations (IO) are traditionally studied as isolated case studies, often independent of their political context. In this study, we conduct 78 in-depth interviews with industry insiders to explore the differences in the nature of IO campaigns across Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and to investigate how this variation is linked to the political dynamics in these countries. We argue and demonstrate that the observed disparities in IO campaigns’ aims, organization, and funding are closely tied to the distinct character of elite competition in each country, where elections serve as critical battlegrounds for power struggles among elites. Specifically, we highlight the intrinsic connection between election campaigns and online influence operations: IO activity typically mirrors the election cycle, and the candidate-centred election campaigns in Indonesia and the Philippines lead to fragmented, ad-hoc forms of IO operations. In contrast, the more state-centric and institutionalized IO operations in Thailand align with the substantial involvement of state institutions in electioneering in that country. We propose two reasons why IO campaigns mirror the structure of elite competition: Firstly, the motivations and behaviour of the political and economic elites funding IO are influenced by the nature of elite competition. Secondly, many IO campaigns are integrated into or run concurrently with politicians’ and parties’ “official” election campaign teams. With our comparative approach we provide a deeper understanding of IO operations and their reflection of political-economic structures.
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“It’s just cybertroopers”: Reflections on two-decades of Malaysian ‘influence operations’
Niki Cheong King's College London
In 2004, three news articles in Malaysia’s New Straits Times – owned and operated by the-then ruling party UMNO – used the term “cybertroopers”, referring to groups of people working for the political party in a cyberwar against “the Opposition”. This would be one of the earliest admissions of ‘influence operations’ by state actors in Malaysia, and arguably around the world. This paper offers a reflection of how the term “cybertroopers”, and by extension, its perceived threat, has evolved in the two decades since that first article – celebrated, demonised and weaponised in various political contexts. These days, “cybertroopers” as a term is no longer in vogue – while there are occasional references to the shortened cytros, other terminology, such as walaun and macai, are more commonly used instead. Drawing insights from the analysis of over 400 news articles from 2004 to 2019, and a series of interviews conducted between 2018 and 2023, this paper asks – in 2024, who, if anyone, is afraid of the big, bad cybertroopers in Malaysia?
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Drowning out dissent: The Thai military’s quest to fabricate popular support on Twitter
Chonlawit Sirikupt University of Tübingen
Why and how do autocracies discursively conduct digital astroturfing against their own citizens? As these regimes increasingly co-opt social media to manipulate online political discourse, the current political disinformation literature continues to privilege a Cold War paradigm, focusing on countries that dominate Western foreign policy priorities and concerns. Its normative bent overlooks understudied cases that have also been weaponizing social media to manipulate domestic online discourses. Moreover, large-N studies that draw on rich empirical trace data made available by platform disclosures remain theoretically disconnected from the logics of regime stabilization and survival. I argue that regime digital astroturfing follows events with collective action potential that constitute perceived threats to regime stability. Regime-linked digital astroturfers exploit platform affordances to discursively construct a semblance of popular support for the ruling regime and resentment for its challengers. I adopt a mixed-methods approach informed by Contextual Text Coding to systematically examine 14,430 tweets linked to the Royal Thai Army in February 2020 to subject my central propositions to initial, albeit in-depth empirical scrutiny. My findings demonstrated how astroturfing attempts on Twitter, which discursively cheerleaded the military/autocratic regime of General Prayut Chan-o-cha with positive frames and devalued their pro-democratic opposition with negative frames, were spurred by a mass shooting incident in the city of Korat that exposed the regime to widespread online backlash. This contribution not only deepens case-specific knowledge about an understudied case in the literature, but also strengthens our understanding about the adaptations of authoritarian legitimation strategies in the digital era.
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Digital Manipulation of Voters: Buzzers and Indonesia’s 2024 Election
Muhammad Alif Alauddin Erasmus University Rotterdam
Warih Aji Pamungkas Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies
During the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, campaign teams made extensive use of social media to influence political opinion and voter behaviour. This strategy raises concerns as it deteriorates the integrity of the electoral process. This research aims to investigate the activities of buzzers (account operators hired by campaign teams) on Twitter during the campaign of the 2024 Indonesian presidential election. To do so, this paper employs a mixed-method approach, using Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Natural Language Processing (NLP) to study the online influence of buzzer accounts. Furthermore, digital ethnography is utilised to examine the interaction patterns, emotional tone, language, and discourse employed by cyber troops. The preliminary findings indicate that these cyber troops are highly influential as their posts reach large audiences. They do so by engaging in targeted and strategic interactions to amplify their influence. These findings suggest that Indonesia’s politicians have a strong capacity to manipulate political debates on Twitter.
Part 2
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Flexing Censorship Muscles and Leveraging Public Sentiments: How The Vietnamese State Scrambles to Sanitize Its Image Online
Dien Luong University of Michigan
In an era where the digital realm plays an outsized role in shaping public perception, Vietnam’s efforts to control its online image stand out for their vigor and strategic depth. This paper investigates Vietnam’s evolving digital strategies, with a focus on its interactions major Western tech companies that include Netflix. As it grapples with the intricacies of a globalized digital audience, Vietnam deftly weaves state power, public sentiment, and digital platforms to navigate the shifting sands of online narratives.
Three primary case studies underpin the analysis, showcasing Vietnam’s determination to oversee its portrayal in cybersphere. A detailed analysis scrutinizes the state’s defense of “provoked public outrage” for its censorship, unveiling a pronounced gap between the state-sponsored narratives and the broader public sentiment. Significantly, this orchestrated digital echo chamber, bolstered by cyber troopers and pro-government Facebook pages, is reminiscent of wider regional practices in online discourse manipulation across Southeast Asia. Such tactics are validated by my prior research indicating that popular backing for Vietnamese government stances may have been artificially amplified.
A historical lens then charts Vietnam’s 25-year trajectory in the realm of online censorship. The intricate dance between economic interests and stringent content regulation is elaborated, with platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok emerging as both commercial gateways and arenas of state influence.
While Vietnam’s strategies echo certain tactics observed in other regional players, notably China, its unique historical and socio-political contexts render its approach distinct. Certain decisions made in the name of censorship not only underscore its drive to control narratives but also inadvertently spotlight the regime’s latent insecurities.
In sum, the paper presents a multifaceted perspective on Vietnam’s digital sanitization attempts. While such strategies might effectively serve immediate state-centric goals, they simultaneously risk amplifying the regime’s inherent vulnerabilities, thus presenting a double-edged sword in the digital age. This exploration furnishes a deeper understanding of the complexities involved in state-led online image management in today’s interconnected world.
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From disinformation to toxic positivity: Indonesia’s 2024 election campaign
Ross Tapsell The Australian National University
This paper examines the shifting nature of disinformation production in Indonesia, paying particular attention to Indonesia’s 2024 presidential elections. While there were examples of fake news to keep fact-checkers busy, but overall this was not campaign based on slander and lies. Such narratives which were previously common in Indonesian elections campaigns - candidate adultery, being pro-LGBTQ, or not being Islamic - did not dominate the online realm. Yet Prabowo’s victory is undoubtedly concerning for democracy. Via a highly strategic, well-funded PR campaign, Prabowo was transformed from being a 72-year-old twice loser who was lagging in the polls, into an affable, cuddly, grandfather with a quirky dance who never looked like losing. The question is: was it disinformation? And if it’s not how we think of disinformation, such as fake news and slander, how should we explain it? This new type of narrative manipulation is a growing phenomenon that scholars are struggling to explain. Terms floated on Southeast Asia are toxic positivity, whitewashing, and digital authoritarianism.
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Manufacturing consent: using cyber troops for selling public policies in Indonesia
Wija Wijayanto Universitas Diponegoro
In the theoretical framework of the public policy cycle, public consultation emerges as an indispensable stage for the development of effective policy measures. However, empirical investigations have consistently revealed the propensity for this crucial step to be sidelined, owing to a myriad of factors. By examining the cases of four contentious public policies in Indonesia, namely the New Normal policy in 2020, the omnibus law in 2020, and the relocation of the capital in 2022, this study contributes to the extant literature by delineating how governmental entities, rather than fostering genuine public consultation, resort to the utilization of cyber troops and social media propaganda to manufacture consent among the populace in virtual spaces. Furthermore, this research endeavors to scrutinize the strategies employed by these cyber troops in disseminating and popularizing the policies, thereby engendering a semblance of public support. Methodologically, this study integrates social network analysis of extensive online conversations pertaining to the aforementioned policies, complemented by in-depth interviews conducted with 48 cybertroopers. The findings of this investigation reveal several key strategies adopted by these entities, including: (a) the orchestration of a substantial volume of online discourse; (b) the deployment of a heterogeneous mix of influencers, counterfeit accounts, and automated bots; (c) the formulation of narratives entailing a blend of fear and persuasion; and (d) the crafting of narratives conducive to amplification by mainstream media channels.
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Understanding the Impact of Chinese Online Information Campaigns on Pro-China Attitudes in Southeast Asia
Tiffany Lau London School of Economics
China’s move from a more cooperative and controversy-avoidant foreign policy stance under Deng Xiaoping to a more aggressive ‘Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’ in the late 2010s under Xi Jinping saw a ramping up of online information campaigns targeted at societies abroad. Southeast Asia has been one such target, with increasing anecdotal evidence of an increase in the volume of pro-China content being circulated in closed messaging groups like WhatsApp, but also of individuals taking on a more pro-China sentiment in recent years. Using quantitative text analysis, I intend to identify the key messages in Chinese online information campaigns that are targeted at foreign audiences. My primary source of data is CGTN’s English-language website. I also aim to analyse a sample of messages circulating in closed WhatsApp groups in Singapore and Malaysia and will collect these using snowball sampling. This paper forms part of a broader research project on understanding the impact of China’s Online Information Campaigns in Southeast Asia, and will be complemented by analysis of public attitude surveys such as Asia Barometer, qualitative interviews, and a survey experiment testing the competing efficacies of the messages on pro-China attitudes. I hope to add to the literature on online information campaigns by providing a detailed and nuanced analysis of Chinese online information campaigns.
Abstract
Over the past decade, there has been a significant surge in online influence operations aimed at manipulating public opinion, posing a substantial and growing threat to democracy. This threat is particularly pronounced in Southeast Asia, where high social media penetration and low newspaper readership create ideal conditions for the flourishing of “buzzers” in Indonesia, “trolls” in the Philippines, or “information operations” in Thailand. In this panel, we delve into the diversity of influence operations across SEA, with a specific focus on the personal trajectories of those involved, their day-to-day practices, the strategies and tactics employed, and the organization and funding of their networks. We explore the causes and consequences of the variation in online influence operations, discussing, among other aspects, the extent of private sector involvement, whether it is a unipolar (state-led) or multipolar (involving various candidates/parties) phenomenon, and the degree of institutionalization within the operating networks.